On the existence of strong Nash equilibria Academic Article

abstract

• This paper investigates the existence of strong Nash equilibria (SNE) in continuous and concave games. It is shown that the coalition consistency property introduced in the paper, together with concavity and continuity of payoffs, permits the existence of SNE in games with compact and convex strategy spaces. We also characterize the existence of SNE by providing necessary and sufficient conditions. We suggest an algorithm for computing SNE. The results are illustrated with applications to economies with multilateral environmental externalities and to the static oligopoly model. 2014 Elsevier Inc.

authors

• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications

altmetric score

• 3

author list (cited authors)

• Nessah, R., & Tian, G.

citation count

• 24

complete list of authors

• Nessah, Rabia||Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

• January 2014

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications  Journal

keywords

• Non Cooperative Game
• Strong Nash Equilibrium
• Weak Pareto-efficiency

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jmaa.2014.01.030

start page

• 871

end page

• 885

volume

• 414

issue

• 2

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2014.01.030