Power flow cyber attacks and perturbation-based defense Conference Paper

abstract

• In this paper, we present two contributions to false data injection attacks and mitigation in electric power systems. First, we introduce a method of creating unobservable attacks on the AC power flow equations. The attack strategy details how an adversary can launch a stealthy attack to achieve a goal. Then, we introduce a proactive defense strategy that is capable of detecting attacks. The defense strategy introduces known perturbations by deliberately probing the system in a specific, structured manner. We show that the proposed approach, under certain conditions, is able to detect the presence of false data injection attacks, as well the attack locations and information about the manipulated data values.

name of conference

• 2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)

authors

• Davis, Katherine

published proceedings

• 2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)

author list (cited authors)

• K. R. Davis, .., K. L. Morrow, .., R. Bobba, .., & E. Heine.

complete list of authors

publication date

• January 2012

keywords

• Ac Power Flow Equations
• Attack Detection Strategy
• Electric Power Systems
• Equations
• False Data Injection Attack Detection
• False Data Injection Attack Mitigation
• Load Flow
• Mathematical Model
• Perturbation-based Defense
• Power Flow Cyber Attacks
• Power Measurement
• Power System Security
• Proactive Defense Strategy
• Probes
• Vectors

start page

• 342

end page

• 347