Modeling resource allocation negotiations Conference Paper

abstract

• 1991 IEEE. Resource allocation problems occur when fixed, limited resources must be allocated among competing alternatives. Disputes arise when decision makers disagree about relative priorities among objectives. The structure of a resource allocation problem refers to characteristics of its feasible settlement space and efficient frontier. These characteristics define the opportunities the problem affords and the constraints it imposes on negotiators. Models of resource allocation problems were constructed under different assumptions concerning negotiators' judgmental preferences. The analysis demonstrated that structure is a function of both (a) the negotiators' preferences and (b) the level of available resources. Three procedures for resolving resource allocation disputes were simulated. Results suggested that different procedures may or may not lead to the same settlement, depending on problem structure. A procedure may favor one negotiator at one level of resource availability, but a different negotiator at another level.

name of conference

• Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

authors

• Mumpower, Jeryl

published proceedings

• Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

author list (cited authors)

• Mumpower, J. L., & Darling, T. A.

citation count

• 6

complete list of authors

• Mumpower, JL||Darling, TA

publication date

• January 1991

publisher

• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)  Publisher

published in

• Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1109/hicss.1991.184197

start page

• 641-649 vol.3

end page

• 649

volume

• iii

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.1991.184197