Incentives for Cooperative Relaying in a Simple Information-Theoretic Model Conference Paper

abstract

• Various cooperative communication schemes have been proposed as a means to increase the capacity of wireless networks. All such schemes assume that users in the network will cooperate perfectly. However, in a decentralized network this assumption is far from true. Users are selfish and care only about their own rates. They can strategically deviate from their agreed role in such cooperative communication schemes leading to a possible degradation for all. In this paper, we study the incentives for cooperative relaying in a simple model, namely the generalized Gaussian relay channel model (or MAC-GF). We characterize all the Nash equilibrium rates and compare it with the Pareto-optimal rates of the generalized Gaussian relay channel model. granted. 2012 IEEE.

name of conference

• 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings

authors

• Kalathil, Dileep

published proceedings

• 2012 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMATION THEORY PROCEEDINGS (ISIT)

author list (cited authors)

• Kalathil, D., & Jain, R.

citation count

• 0

complete list of authors

• Kalathil, Dileep||Jain, Rahul

publication date

• January 2012

publisher

• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)  Publisher

keywords

• Cooperative Communications
• Game Theory
• Generalized Gaussian Relay Channel
• Spectrum Sharing

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1109/isit.2012.6283971

International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 13

• 9781467325790

start page

• 2521

end page

• 2525

volume

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isit.2012.6283971