Self-serving biases in social norm compliance Academic Article

abstract

• 2019 The social stigma against the payoff-maximizing strategy in dictator games is being accepted by more researchers as the most accurate rationalization for the divergence between classical economic theory and laboratory behavior in this setting. By constructing a fake entitlement treatment, where dictator role assignment was purely random, but masqueraded in a way that was open for interpretation, we investigate whether social norm compliance is an inclination or obligation in dictator experiments. We provide compelling evidence that dictators are not predisposed to seek adherence with prevailing social norms, but instead, interpreted the setting to serve their own self-interest.

authors

• Palma, Marco

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION

altmetric score

• 2.7

author list (cited authors)

• Kassas, B., & Palma, M. A.

citation count

• 8

complete list of authors

• Kassas, Bachir||Palma, Marco A

publication date

• January 2019

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  Journal

keywords

• Dictator Giving
• Double Hurdle Model
• Fake Entitlement
• Social Norms

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.010

start page

• 388

end page

• 408

volume

• 159

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.010