Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice Academic Article

abstract

• 2018 Elsevier B.V. This paper investigates the responsiveness of priority-based affirmative action in school choice. We consider two efficiency-improved mechanismsKesten's EADAM (efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism) and DA-TTC mechanism (running deferred acceptance and then running top trading cycles algorithm). We show that neither EADAM nor DA-TTC is minimally responsive to the priority-based affirmative action policy. That is, under EADAM or DA-TTC, there are market situations in which a stronger affirmative action policy may result in a Pareto inferior assignment for the minority students.

authors

• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• Economics Letters

author list (cited authors)

• Jiao, Z., & Tian, G.

citation count

• 2

complete list of authors

• Jiao, Zhenhua||Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

• January 2018

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Economics Letters  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.020

start page

• 60

end page

• 62

volume

• 166

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.020