Differential bank behaviors around the Dodd-Frank Act size thresholds Academic Article

abstract

• 2018 Elsevier Inc. The DoddFrank Act created differential regulatory requirements for banks above specified asset size thresholds. Event study results imply greater expected net regulatory costs for above-threshold banks. Consistent with hypotheses that near-below-threshold banks alter their behavior to attempt to avoid or delay the regulatory costs and/or to ensure growth that they do experience is highly beneficial, we find that near-below-threshold banks grow assets, risk-weighted assets, and total loans more slowly, and charge higher rates on commercial loans. The results suggest that the DoddFrank Act created costs that near-below-threshold banks attempt to avoid by altering their behaviors in economically important ways.

authors

• Bouwman, Christa
• Johnson, Shane

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION

author list (cited authors)

• Bouwman, C., Hu, S. S., & Johnson, S. A.

citation count

• 39

complete list of authors

• Bouwman, Christa HS||Hu, Shuting Sophia||Johnson, Shane A

publication date

• January 2018

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Financial Intermediation  Journal

keywords

• Bank Equity Capital Ratios
• Bank Size
• Bank Stress Tests
• Credit Availability
• Dodd-frank Act
• Lending
• Loan Pricing
• Regulatory Disclosure

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jfi.2018.01.005

start page

• 47

end page

• 57

volume

• 34

issue

• 2974235

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2018.01.005