Noncooperative Game-Based Distributed Charging Control for Plug-In Electric Vehicles in Distribution Networks
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abstract
2005-2012 IEEE. Increasing penetration of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) has a substantial impact on the operation of power distribution networks. Given the fast-growing load demands from PEVs and unmatched infrastructure investment in transformer and feeder capacity, the PEV charging is subjected to both spatially and temporally security constraints beyond which the network failure may occur. This paper proposes a game-theory-based distributed charging control method to coordinate large-scale PEVs without compromising the security of the distribution network. Under a noncooperative game framework, a price-driven charging model is designed to minimize the cost of each individual PEV customer while satisfying the network loading constraints. Then, a Newton-type method is developed to find a better Nash equilibrium of the game model at a superlinear convergence rate. Furthermore, an accelerated gradient method is proposed to tackle the subproblem for each user's best response. The update of the user's best response is implemented in a distributed way in order to protect user's privacy. The convergence rate of the proposed algorithms is rigorously proved. The effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed methods are tested on the IEEE 13-bus system.
