The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings Academic Article

abstract

• 2016 Elsevier Inc. This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended maxmin preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that the deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for agents on the proposing side under the extended maxmin preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. Neither the Blocking Lemma nor the incentive compatibility can be guaranteed if the preference condition is weaker than the extended maxmin criterion.

authors

• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• Games and Economic Behavior

author list (cited authors)

• Jiao, Z., & Tian, G.

citation count

• 9

complete list of authors

• Jiao, Zhenhua||Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

• January 2017

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Games and Economic Behavior  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.015

start page

• 44

end page

• 55

volume

• 102