A shape constrained estimator of bidding function of first-price sealed-bid auctions Academic Article

abstract

• 2016 This paper is concerned with economic analysis of first-price sealed-bid auctions with risk averse bidders. The identification is based on exogenous variations in the number of bidders across auctions. We present a shape constrained estimator of the bidding function, which satisfies the theoretical properties of passing through origin, positivity and monotonicity. The underlying utility function and bidder value distribution are readily obtained from the estimated bidding function. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate good performance of the proposed estimator.

authors

• Zhang, Yu (Yvette)

published proceedings

• ECONOMICS LETTERS

author list (cited authors)

• Zhang, Y. Y.

citation count

• 3

complete list of authors

• Zhang, Yu Yvette

publication date

• January 2017

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Economics Letters  Journal

keywords

• Bidding Functions
• First-price Auctions
• Risk Aversion
• Shaped Constrained Estimator

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.001

start page

• 67

end page

• 72

volume

• 150

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.001