The objective of this work is to develop a scheme to minimize a combination of power consumption and congestion delay in communication networks. I model the network as a set of parallel links, with flows that are able to divide their traffic among the links available to them. Power consumption at each link is concave and increasing in the load, with a non-zero intercept at the origin corresponding to idle power consumption. I believe it is possible to minimize the overall power consumption by possibly sharing links and shutting down the idle links, as long as it does not lead to significant congestion in the network. In this project, I focus on developing incentives for flows to choose the minimum cost solution. My solutions involve two elements - (i) a mypopic and selfish controller adopted by each source, which attempts to minimize cost seen by that flow, and (ii) a pricing scheme at each link whose objective is to provide appropriate signals to the controllers at the source. I use ideas drawn from population games to choose the set of source controllers, while I experiment with using marginal costs and weighted Shapley values for the pricing scheme. I show that the weighted Shapley value as a pricing scheme is superior to that of marginal cost pricing in some simple cases.
