Analysis of Coupon Incentive-Based Demand Response with Bounded Consumer Rationality Conference Paper

abstract

• 2014 IEEE. Incentive-based demand response in electric distribution grid has been recently proposed as an alternative to price-based mechanism. In this paper, the performance of a coupon incentive-based demand response (CIDR) in a real world setting is formulated and critically assessed. In the scheme of CIDR, load serving entities (LSEs) issue coupons to consumers whenever real-time wholesale price spikes are expected, thus avoiding further loss when price-affecting contingencies happen in near real-time. expected outcome of CIDR with bounded rational consumers are formulated and analyzed. It is shown that there exists fundamental connection between scheme of CIDR and conventional price-based demand response. Game theoretical models are introduced as a means to capturing the interactions between load serving entities and consumers with bounded rationality. Numerical examples obtained from Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) illustrate the efficacy of proposed analysis.

name of conference

• 2014 North American Power Symposium (NAPS)

authors

• Xie, Le

published proceedings

• 2014 NORTH AMERICAN POWER SYMPOSIUM (NAPS)

author list (cited authors)

• Ming, H., & Xie, L. e.

citation count

• 14

complete list of authors

• Ming, Hao||Xie, Le

publication date

• January 2014

publisher

• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)  Publisher

published in

• n2163-4939ISSN  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1109/naps.2014.6965456

International Standard Book Number (ISBN) 13

• 9781479959044

start page

• 1

end page

• 6

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/naps.2014.6965456