The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs
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In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs), each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized, i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP. © 2006 IEEE.
author list (cited authors)
Shakkottai, S., Altman, E., & Kumar, A.