On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen Academic Article

abstract

• 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. In a recent paper in this journal (2014), we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Steglich-Petersen (Erkenntnis 19, 2014) claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.

authors

• Peterson, Martin

published proceedings

• ERKENNTNIS

author list (cited authors)

• Carter, J. A., & Peterson, M.

citation count

• 1

publication date

• April 2016

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

keywords

• 50 Philosophy And Religious Studies
• 5002 History And Philosophy Of Specific Fields
• 5003 Philosophy

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3

start page

• 297

end page

• 304

volume

• 81

issue

• 2

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3