Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions
Academic Article
Overview
Research
Identity
Additional Document Info
Other
View All
Overview
abstract
2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. It is a natural assumption in mainstream epistemological theory that ascriptions of knowledge of a proposition p track strength of epistemic position vis--vis p. It is equally natural to assume that the strength of ones epistemic position is maximally high in cases where p concerns a simple analytic truth (as opposed to an empirical truth). For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that ones epistemic position vis--vis a cat is a cat is harder to improve than ones position vis--vis a cat is on the mat, and consequently, that the former is at least as unambiguous a case of knowledge as the latter. The current paper, however, presents empirical evidence which challenges this intuitive line of reasoning. Our study on the epistemic intuitions of hundreds of academic philosophers supports the idea that simple and uncontroversial analytic propositions are less likely to qualify as knowledge than empirical ones. We show that our results, though at odds with orthodox theories of knowledge in mainstream epistemology, can be explained in a way consistent with Wittgensteins remarks on hinge propositions or with Stalnakers pragmatics of assertion. We then present and evaluate a number of lines of response mainstream theories of knowledge could appeal to in accommodating our results. Finally, we show how each line of response runs into some prima facie difficulties. Thus, our observed asymmetry between knowing a cat is a cat and knowing a cat is on the mat presents a puzzle which mainstream epistemology needs to resolve.
