Traditional scholarship maintains that the United States Marine Corps' operational success in the Pacific War rested upon two dominant factors: committed theoretical preparation and courageous battlefield action. Put simply, the Marines wrestled with the challenges of the amphibious assault in the 1920s and 1930s and developed the tools and methods necessary to seize a hostile beach. Then, they sent their brave and spirited infantrymen to advance across the enemy-held islands of the South and Central Pacific. Though this narrative accurately highlights essential elements of the Marines' triumph, it fails to account for substantial interwar deficiencies in fire control and coordination as well as the critical development of those capabilities between 1942 and 1945. In the years of war between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the 1945 assault on Iwo Jima, the V Amphibious Corps embarked on a path of deliberate, intrawar adaptation that improved the administration, training, equipping, and tactics of American fire control and coordination teams. By war's end, the teams were an indispensable element of Allied success. This dissertation examines the V Corps' story of wartime adaptation and innovation. Through the persistent and integrated application of air and naval fires, the Marines learned to seize the most difficult of military objectives. The study also serves to highlight the critical role of the specialist--both Marine and Sailor--that planned, coordinated, applied, and adjusted fire support from the sea and air. In their contribution, the specialists behind the riflemen enabled American victory in the Pacific.
