Incentive compatible mechanism design for synthetic task allocation in virtual organizations Conference Paper uri icon

abstract

  • In most computational organizational models, the designers of traditional task allocation mechanisms generally make an implicit assumption that organizational agents will report their true capabilities to the mechanisms. This assumption is not true any more for the virtual organizations [1], One of the most important benefits of a virtual organization is executing synthetic tasks by forming temporary team composed of experts from different fields and independent organizations through Internet. In this paper, we formalize a synthetic task allocation problem to the algorithmic mechanism design optimization problem [12,15], Each synthetic task needs to be accomplished through the cooperation among agents who belong to different groups that are self-interested and have different specialties. The objective of this problem is to minimize the total amount of time of finishing a bunch of synthetic tasks. We developed two incentive compatible mechanisms for the synthetic task allocation problem studied in this paper. 2005 IEEE.

name of conference

  • International Conference on Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems, 2005.

published proceedings

  • 2005 International Conference on Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems

author list (cited authors)

  • He, L. L., & Ioerger, T. R.

citation count

  • 0

complete list of authors

  • He, LL||Ioerger, TR

publication date

  • January 2005