Probability forecasting and central bank accountability Academic Article

abstract

• The paper studies probability forecasts of inflation and GDP by monetary authorities. Such forecasts can contribute to central bank transparency and reputation building. Problems with principal and agent make the usual argument for using scoring rules to motivate probability forecasts confused; however, their use to evaluate forecasts remains valid. Public comparison of forecasting results with a "shadow" committee is helpful to promote reputation building and thus serves the motivational role. The Brier score and its Yates-partition of the Bank of England's forecasts are compared with those of a group of non-bank experts. 2005 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

authors

• Bessler, David

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF POLICY MODELING

author list (cited authors)

• Casillas-Olvera, G., & Bessler, D. A.

citation count

• 33

complete list of authors

• Casillas-Olvera, G||Bessler, DA

publication date

• February 2006

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Policy Modeling: A Social Science Forum of World Issue  Journal

keywords

• Accountability
• Brier Score
• Central Banks
• Probability Forecasting
• Yates' Partition

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2005.10.004

start page

• 223

end page

• 234

volume

• 28

issue

• 2

URL

• http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1016%2Fj.jpolmod.2005.10.004