Audit committee financial expertise and earnings management: The role of status Academic Article

abstract

• 2014 Elsevier B.V. Regulatory pressure to increase both audit committee financial expertise and board independence has resulted in lower status for audit committees relative to management. This status differential is relevant because expertise and relative status are important determinants of each party[U+05F3]s ability to influence outcomes, particularly when parties face conflicting goals. We find that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative status are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as measured by accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. These results speak to benefits and limitations of financial expertise, which have been the focus of considerable debate.

authors

• Ege, Matthew

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS

altmetric score

• 0.25

author list (cited authors)

• Badolato, P. G., Donelson, D. C., & Ege, M.

citation count

• 291

complete list of authors

• Badolato, Patrick G||Donelson, Dain C||Ege, Matthew

publication date

• January 2014

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Accounting and Economics  Journal

keywords

• Audit Committees
• Earnings Management
• Financial Expertise
• Status

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.08.006

start page

• 208

end page

• 230

volume

• 58

issue

• 2-3

URL

• http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1016%2Fj.jacceco.2014.08.006