Antirealism and universal knowability Academic Article

abstract

• Truth's universal knowability entails its discovery. This threatens antirealism, which is thought to require it. Fortunately, antirealism is not committed to it. Avoiding it requires adoption (and extension) of Dag Prawitz's position in his long-term disagreement with Michael Dummett on the notion of provability involved in intuitionism's identification of it with truth. Antirealism (intuitionism generalized) must accommodate a notion of lost-opportunity truth (a kind of recognition-transcendent truth), and even truth consisting in the presence of unperformable verifications. Dummett's position cannot abide this, while Prawitz's can. Antirealism's epistemic notion of truth derives from general features of its meaning theory, not from a universal knowability principle. Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009.

authors

• Hand, Michael

published proceedings

• SYNTHESE

author list (cited authors)

• Hand, M.

citation count

• 4

complete list of authors

• Hand, Michael

publication date

• March 2010

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

published in

• Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science  Journal

keywords

• Antirealism
• Dummett
• Knowability
• Prawitz

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/s11229-009-9674-x

start page

• 25

end page

• 39

volume

• 173

issue

• 1

URL

• http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11229-009-9674-x