Strong and Weak Expectations Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • Fine has shown that assigning any value to the Pasadena game is consistent with a certain standard set of axioms for decision theory. However, I suggest that it might be reasonable to believe that the value of an individual game is constrained by the long-run payout of repeated plays of the game. Although there is no value that repeated plays of the Pasadena game converges to in the standard strong sense, I show that there is a weaker sort of convergence it exhibits, and use this to define a notion of 'weak expectation' that can give values to the Pasadena game and many others, though not to all games that fail to have a strong expectation in the standard sense. Easwaran 2008.

published proceedings

  • Mind

author list (cited authors)

  • Easwaran, K.

citation count

  • 24

complete list of authors

  • Easwaran, Kenny

publication date

  • January 2008