This paper focuses on the first iteration of Thrasymachus claim as reported in Book I of Platos
Republicthat justice is the interest of the stronger, namely, a political interpretation, according to which justice is the interest of the stronger party in each polisas established in the law. The author contends that this argument is logically and rhetorically distinct from Thrasymachus subsequent restatements of his position in RepublicI. The political version of the Thrasymachean position enjoyed currency after the composition of the Republicand in a way that was not entirely negative. The current paper examines two cases of this reception: the first, in Platos own late work, the Laws, where he reengages with the Thrasymachean doctrine; the second, in the De republica Anglorumof Sir Thomas Smith, an early modern theorist who self-consciously defended Thrasymachus theory of justice. The papers immediate purpose is to suggest that Thrasymachus conception of political justice, in particular, has far more coherence and power than the supposed refutation of it in the Republicmight leads us to believe.