The stability of many-to-many matching with maxmin preferences Academic Article uri icon


  • 2015 Elsevier B.V. This paper investigates the two-sided many-to-many matching problem, where every agent has max-min preference. The equivalence between the pairwise-stability and the setwise-stability is obtained. It is shown that the pairwise-stability implies the strong corewise-stability and the former may be strictly stronger than the latter. We also show that the strong core may be a proper subset of the core. The deferred acceptance algorithm yields a pairwise-stable matching. Thus the set of stable matchings (in all four senses) is non-empty.

published proceedings

  • Economics Letters

author list (cited authors)

  • Jiao, Z., & Tian, G.

citation count

  • 5

complete list of authors

  • Jiao, Zhenhua||Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

  • January 2015