Sharing an increase of the rent fairly Academic Article uri icon


  • 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We characterize the family of non-contestable budget-monotone rules for the allocation of objects and money as those obtained by maximizing a maxmin social welfare function among all non-contestable allocations. We provide three additional seemingly independent approaches to construct these rules. We present three applications of this characterization. First, we show that one can rectify any non-contestable rule without losing non-contestability. Second, we characterize the preferences that admit, for each budget, a non-contestable allocation satisfying a minimal or maximal individual consumption of money constraint. Third, we study continuity properties of the non-contestable correspondence.

published proceedings


altmetric score

  • 0.5

author list (cited authors)

  • Velez, R. A.

citation count

  • 10

complete list of authors

  • Velez, Rodrigo A

publication date

  • January 2017