Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market Academic Article

abstract

• 2015 Elsevier Inc. We study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal-income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents. Strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents. They non-cooperatively coordinate on the equal-income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are Pareto undominated for them within the set of equal-income competitive allocations. Sincere agents are protected to some extent, however. Their welfare is usually above their maximin payoff.

authors

• Velez, Rodrigo

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

author list (cited authors)

• Velez, R. A.

citation count

• 10

complete list of authors

• Velez, Rodrigo A

publication date

• May 2015

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Economic Theory  Journal

keywords

• Bounded Rationality
• Equal-income Competitive Social Choice Functions
• Indivisible Goods
• Sincere And Sophisticated Agents

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006

start page

• 1114

end page

• 1129

volume

• 157

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006