Counterterrorism strategies in the lab Academic Article

abstract

• We conduct experiments to test the collective action dilemmas associated with defensive and proactive counterterror strategies. Defensive policies are associated with creating public 'bads' (e. g., a commons) whereas proactive policies are akin to the voluntary provision of public goods. When combined, the inefficiency of collective action is exacerbated, resulting in a situation known as a Prisoner's Dilemma squared (PD2). Deterministic versus probabilistic equivalent versions of the associated externalities are compared within a laboratory setting. Experimental results reveal that the collective action problem associated with counterterror strategies is deepened in uncertain environments, and is indeed a robust regularity that is not easily overcome; as individuals gain more experience, they become even more self-interested. 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

authors

• Eckel, Catherine

published proceedings

• PUBLIC CHOICE

author list (cited authors)

• Arce, D. G., Bakshi, S., Croson, R., Eckel, C. C., Fatas, E., & Kass, M.

citation count

• 9

complete list of authors

• Arce, Daniel G||Bakshi, Sneha||Croson, Rachel TA||Eckel, Catherine C||Fatas, Enrique||Kass, Malcolm

publication date

• December 2011

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

published in

• Public Choice  Journal

keywords

• Collective Action
• Commons Game
• Counterterror Policy
• Lab Experiment
• Prisoner's Dilemma

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/s11127-011-9884-x

start page

• 465

end page

• 478

volume

• 149

issue

• 3-4

URL

• http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11127-011-9884-x