Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment Academic Article

abstract

• 2016 Elsevier Inc. We investigate strategic behavior in a centralized matching clearinghouse based on the GaleShapley deferred acceptance algorithm. To do so, we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the degree to which agents strategically misrepresent their preferences by submitting a truncation of their true preferences. Our experimental design uses a restricted environment in which a particular form of truncation is always a best response. We find that subjects do not truncate their preferences more often when truncation is profitable. They do, however, truncate their preferences less often when truncation is dangerous that is, when there is a risk of over-truncating and remaining unmatched. Our findings suggest that behavioral insights can play an important role in the field of market design.

authors

• Castillo, Marco

published proceedings

• GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

author list (cited authors)

• Castillo, M., & Dianat, A.

citation count

• 17

complete list of authors

• Castillo, Marco||Dianat, Ahrash

publication date

• January 2016

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Games and Economic Behavior  Journal

keywords

• Experiments
• Truncation Strategies
• Two-sided Matching

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.006

start page

• 180

end page

• 196

volume

• 98

URL

• http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1016%2Fj.geb.2016.06.006