War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • Studies of signaling in international relations reveal how punishing bluffing ex post through domestic audience costs or opposition groups facilitates credible ex ante communication among states and reduces the impetus toward war. Global integration of economic markets may also reduce uncertainty by making talk costly ex ante. Autonomous global capital can respond dramatically to political crises. To the degree that globalization forces leaders to choose between pursuing competitive political goals and maintaining economic stability, it reveals the intensity of leaders' preferences, reducing the need for military contests as a method of identifying mutually acceptable bargains. Asymmetric integration can dampen the pacific effects of globalization, but asymmetry does not in itself exacerbate dispute behavior. We present the theory and offer preliminary corroborative tests of implications of the argument on postwar militarized disputes.

published proceedings

  • International Studies Quarterly

author list (cited authors)

  • Gartzke, E., & Li, Q

citation count

  • 83

complete list of authors

  • Gartzke, Erik||Li, Quan

publication date

  • December 2003