Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining Academic Article uri icon


  • Previous formal models of two-level games, which try to determine whether a domestic ratification constraint provides an executive with bargaining leverage in international negotiations, pay little attention to the exact nature of the executive's constituency and the source of the constraint. The author uses a gametheoretic model to show that an executive with a national constituency such as a nationally elected president benefits by being constrained. An executive with a constituency distinct from that of the ratifying legislators, however, isworse off under greater constraints, when the constraintscome from constituencies other than his or her own. This can occur, for instance, in a minority or coalition parliamentary government consisting of parties with different and in fact opposing constituencies. Testable hypotheses are derived on the effect of the party composition of the legislature on the executive's constraint.

published proceedings

  • Journal of Conflict Resolution

author list (cited authors)

  • Tarar, A.

citation count

  • 26

complete list of authors

  • Tarar, Ahmer

publication date

  • June 2005