My dissertation examines the underlying factors that shape public attitudes toward nuclear weaponization and investigates the causal public opinion-nuclear policy linkage. The domestic causes of nuclear proliferation have been the subject of a wide array of scholarly research. Yet, surprisingly, the existing literature tells us remarkably little about the roles of the political elites, mass publics, and their political interactions. There is no question about the importance of political elites in nuclear proliferation. They have professional skills and information advantages to decide a country's nuclear weapons development. Political elites can even manipulate public opinion to control the domestic voices and maximize the chances of a favorable outcome. Empirical results demonstrate that their manipulations are powerful in shifting individual armament belief structures. Pro- and anti-weaponization manipulations both move public opinion in the intended directions even though the messages contract objective facts. Besides elite manipulations, the costs of proliferation shift individual proliferation beliefs as well. The economic and human costs of nuclear armament decrease public support for building atomic weapons. However, the hostile international responses invoke nationalism among the public and therefore citizens rally around the incumbency. Such rally effects mitigate the negative cost outcomes. In a nutshell, this dissertation illustrates that political elites' pro- and anti-weaponization messages and the costs of nuclear proliferation have a significant impact on public attitudes toward nuclear weapons acquisition. However, empirical analysis reports that political elites do not factor public opinion into their proliferation decision making. They are skeptical about the public's professionalism and think the influences of mass opinion in their nuclear armament decision making can damage national core interests. In other words, political elites are muted to public opinion because they prefer an elite-centric decision making process. Instead, political elites use public opinion as an instrument to bolster their ex-ante proliferation beliefs. This implies that, given high domestic support for building nuclear weapons, political elites tend to be more confident to go nuclear if they think nuclear weapons development is necessary. Furthermore, the public attitudes toward nuclear proliferation matter because citizens are more likely to cast their ballots for a pro-armament political candidate. Such voting behaviors are noteworthy because the more pro-weaponization elites hold office, the more likely a country is to attempt to develop atomic weapons when elected political elites consider nuclear weaponization as a last resort for national security. Overall, my dissertation attempts to find answers about a longstanding scholarly debate, who follows whom, in the context of nuclear politics and shed lights on how the dynamics of political elites and masses, especially in a democracy, can cause nuclear proliferation.
